IS  THE 


TREASURY  OP  THE  UNITED  STATES 


MANAGED  FOR  PRIVATE  PROFIT  ? 


BY 


GEO.  W.  W2.RRER, 


BANKER. 


BOSTON: 

A.  WILLIAMS  AND  COMPANY,  PUBLISHERS. 

1869. 


IS  THE 


TREASURY  OE  THE  UNITED  STATES 


MANAGED  FOR  PRIVATE  PROFIT  ? 


BY 

% 

GEO.  W.  WARREY, 

BANKER. 


BOSTON: 

A.  WILLIAMS  AND  COMPANY,  PUBLISHERS. 

1869. 


I 


The  following  article  is  republished  from  the 

BOSTON  COMMERCIAL  BULLETIN  OF  MARCH  14,  1868, 

in  compliance  with  the  request  of  friends  desiring  copies,  that  edition  having  been  early 
exhausted,  and  will  be  followed  soon  with 


WHO  ARE  THE  DEMORALIZED  NOW  ? 


Is  the  Treasury  of  the  United  States 
Managed  for  Private  Profit? 


That  an  affirmative  answer  must  be  given  to  this 
question,  is  the  growing  conviction  of  the  business  men 
of  this  country  and  of  the  financial  circles  of  Europe ; 
and  this  conviction  is  the  primary  cause  of  the  paralysis 
which  is  everywhere  manifest  in  the  business  affairs  of 
our  own  country  and  of  the  low  state  of  our  credit 
abroad.  Want  of  confidence  is  felt  at  home  and 
abroad. 

Credit  and  prosperity  have  their  foundation  in  confi- 
dence, and  are  not  to  be  found  when  this  is  wanting. 

For  the  first  time  in  our  history,  the  prosperity  of  the 
business  community  is  entirely  dependent  upon  the  wise 
management  of  the  public  Treasury;  and,  for  the  first 
time  in  our  history,  we  see  that  department  managed 
for  the  benefit  of  speculators. 

Whether  this  is  intentional,  or  wffiether  it  is  the  want 
of  skill,  of  shrewdness,  or  of  judgment,  on  the  part  of 
those  having  control  of  the  Treasury,  is  the  problem  we 
should  like  to  solve. 

When  we  consider  the  fact  that  the  financiers  of  New 
York  have  a controlling  voice  in  the  direction  of  finan- 
cial affairs  at  Washington,  we  might,  perhaps,  consider 


o\^\  1 


4 


that  a sufficient  answer  to  all  the  questions  that  force 
themselves  upon  our  attention;  but  it  is  this  very  fact 
which  we  have  to  account  for.  Why  should  the  finan- 
ciers of  New  York  (a  city  the  least  American  of  all  our 
Northern  and  Western  cities,  whose  merchants  are  spec- 
ulators, and  whose  financiers  are  Wall-street  gamblers 
who  care  more  for  personal  gain  than  the  prosperity 
of  the  country)  have  this  control  of  the  National 
Treasury  ? As  soon  might  one  expect  a loyal  President 
to  look  to  South  Carolina  for  political,  as  an  honest  and 
able  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to  the  city  of  New  York 
for  disinterested  financial  counsel. 

If  we  go  back  to  the  administration  of  Mr.  Chase,  we 
are  unable  to  decide  whether  New-York  influence,  or 
his  own  vain  desire  to  publish  the  rate  of  interest  in  his 
returns  at  four  per  cent  and  a fraction,  — by  including 
his  issue  of  greenbacks, — induced  him  to  issue  his  last 
two  hundred  millions  of  greenbacks,  rather  than  sell  his 
5.20  bonds  at  less  than  par  value,  thereby  doubling  the 
cost  of  every  article  of  supplies  which  the  government 
was  purchasing,  and  adding  thus  hundreds  of  millions  to 
the  national  debt. 

We  are  unable  to  decide,  for  the  reason  that  this  was 
the  first  great  inflation  which  filled  the  pockets  of  the 
speculators,  and  sharpened  their  appetites  for  future 
opportunities  of  the  same  kind. 

With  the  closing  months  of  the  administration  of  Mr. 
Chase,  the  gold  receipts  for  duties  increasingly  exceeded 
the  interest  payments  in  gold,  thereby  causing  an  accu- 
mulation of  gold  in  the  Sub-Treasury,  and  taking  from 
the  market  that  which  was  already  scarce;  the  amount 
in  the  Sub-Treasury  April  1,  1864,  in  New  York  alone, 
reaching  twenty-six  millions,  seven  hundred  and  seven- 


5 


ty-eight  thousand,  six  hundred  and  eighty-three  and 
fifty-one  one-hundredths  dollars  (26,778,683.51),  hav- 
ing steadily  increased  from  five  millions,  nine  hundred 
and  fourteen  thousand,  five  hundred  and  fifty-six  and 
seventy-eight  one-hundredths  dollars  (5,914,556.78),  and 
the  premium  from  twenty-seven  (27)  to  sixty-seven  (67) 
as  steadily  ; and  the  major  part  of  that  held  by  the  New- 
York  banks  was  locked  up  by  the  State  laws,  and  the 
agreement  of  the  banks  to  hold  in  their  vaults  the  same 
amount  as  was  held  at  the  time  of  suspension,  thereby 
leaving  but  a small  amount  of  free  gold  upon  the  mar- 
ket, and  tempting  speculators  to  make  a corner  on  gold. 

On  the  14th  of  this  same  April,  1864,  we  wrote  to  a 
Massachusetts  senator  in  Washington,  calling  his  atten- 
tion to  this  danger,  and  saying  that  we  could,  with  a 
half  dozen  men  no  stronger  than  ourselves,  make  a cor- 
ner on  gold,  and,  if  made,  that  we  could  as  easily  run 
gold  up  to  three  hundred  as  two  hundred.  We  received 
a “ thank  you  ” for  our  pains,  and  looked  on  to  see 
others  make  the  corner  we  had  foreseen  and  endeavored 
to  prevent. 

Within  three  weeks  the  movement  we  had  feared  was 
commenced  in  New  York  by  parties  never  friendly  to 
the  “Northern  Uprising;”  and,  the  first  week  in  July, 
gold  touched  2854. 

The  acceptance  of  the  Treasury  Department  by  Mr. 
Fessenden  gave  great  relief  and  joy  to  the  loyal  con- 
servative financial  men  of  the  country ; for  they  knew 
well  that  he  had  not  favored  so  great  an  inflation  of  the 
currency,  and  that  all  the  money  the  Government 
wanted,  the  people  were  bound  to  give,  and  that  the 
more  it  cost,  without  inflation,  the  further  it  would  go 
in  buying  supplies. 


6 


In  Mr.  Fessenden  the  gold  - gamblers  found  their 
master.  Soon  after  entering  upon  his  office  (Aug.  20), 
he  ordered  the  pre-payment  of  interest  coupons  to 
November  inclusive.  Gold  was  then  157  premium. 
For  a few  days  the  influence  of  this  order  was  not  felt 
in  the  market : holders  of  coupons  could  not  tell 
whether  gold  was  going  higher  or  lower ; if  higher, 
they  wanted  to  hold  on ; if  lower,  to  sell.  The  gam- 
blers were  equally  in  doubt : there  was  no  fixed  amount 
for  them  to  measure  and  “ carry.”  They  hesitated ; and 
their  hesitation  weakened  the  market.  Holders  of  cou- 
pons began  to  sell ; and  this  carried  down  the  premium 
and  hurried  up  the  sellers ; for  a “ falling  market  will 
always  be  well  supplied.”  The  premium  rapidly  fell 
off,  touching  as  low  as  85  before  the  first  of  October ; 
thus  demonstrating  the  advantage  of  a daily  supply  to 
the  market  to  meet  the  daily  demand,  and  the  folly  of 
the  present  management,  which  makes  a daily  demand 
for  gold  to  be  locked  up  in  the  sub-treasury,  without 
any  returning  daily  supply. 

“ The  London  Times  ” of  about  the  same  date  as  the 
order  of  Secretary  Fessenden,  in  one  of  its  usual 
friendly  articles  upon  our  finances,  positively  assured 
its  readers,  that  “ the  United  States  might  possibly  pay 
the  September  coupons,  but  would  never  be  able  to  pay 
the  November,  in  gold.”  When  we  were  reading  that 
article  here,  the  order  of  our  Secretary  was  received  in 
London,  and  gave  new  confidence  to  our  friends  abroad, 
and  the  lie  to  the  London  croaker. 

We  were  constantly  hearing  objections  made  to  the 
interference  of  the  government  with  the  gold  market 
in  its  sales  of  gold,  but  never  to  its  combination  to 
“ bull  the  market .” 


We  say  combination;  for  no  organization  of  bankers 
and  brokers  could  compare  in  power  with  the  law, 
which  requires  every  importer  to  go  into  the  market, 
every  day  in  the  year,  to  buy  gold  to  pay  into  the  sub- 
treasury, there  to  be  locked  up,  and  only  paid  out,  in 
part,  six  times  a year1  (the  amount  for  duties  in  1865, 
paid  in,  reaching  $176,000,000,  while  the  amount  paid 
out  for  interest  was  only  $72,000,000 : we  omit  the 
odd  numbers),  tempting  thus  even  the  loyal  “ to  carry  ” 
the  fixed  amounts,  as  the  needy  importers  must  come 
to  them  for  supplies,  and  pay  their  price,  until  the  Gov- 
ernment let  out  another  moiety. 

How  we  cry  out  against  the  avaricious  speculator, 
who,  in  time  of  famine,  locks  up  his  granaries,  that  he 
may  thereby  increase  the  scarcity,  whilst  this  legal 
hoarding  on  the  part  of  the  Government,  which  is  con- 
tinually enhancing  the  value  of  gold,  and  forcing  upon 
the  foreign  markets  all  our  securities  — government 
bonds,  State  bonds,  railroad  bonds,  and  stocks,  &c.  — at 
a ruinous  depreciation,  awakens  no  outcry ! 

In  a letter  dated  Frankfort,  one  of  the  first  bankers 
of  Europe,  after  speaking  of  the  evil  influence  of 
Butler’s  raid  upon  the  5-2 0s,  says,  “ The  steadiness  of 
the  high  gold  prices  with  you  also  contributes  to  the 
uneasiness  here : the  fact  is,  that,  after  several  years  of 
peace,  forty  per  cent  premium  on  gold  is  a great  disap- 
pointment. Look  at  Austria,  which  has  been  con- 
sidered almost  a bankrupt,  and  yet  gold  is  not  above 
twenty  per  cent,  and  Italy  ten  and  twelve  per  cent  pre- 
mium.” 

No  comment  necessary. 

Mr.  Fessenden  retired  from  the  Treasury  March  4, 
1865,  to  resume  his  place  in  the  Senate. 


8 


During  his  administration  the  gold  in  the  sub- 
treasury was  not  allowed  to  accumulate.  The  amount 
in  the  New-York  sub-treasury,  as  reported  from  month 
to  month,  with  little  variation  for  the  eight  months, 
averaged  eleven  millions,  six  hundred  thirty-seven 
thousand,  nine  hundred  and  thirty  and  seventy-seven 
one-hundredths  dollars  ($11,637,930.77) ; being  on  the 
1st  of  March,  three  days  before  his  retirement  ($14,- 
368,734.52),  fourteen  millions,  three  hundred  and  sixty- 
eight  thousand,  seven  hundred  and  thirty-four  and  fiftj^- 
two-one-hundredths  dollars  • and  the  price  of  gold 
ninety-eight  (98)  premium,  with  the  Rebellion  still 
unconquered. 

With  the  incoming  of  Mr.  McCulloch,  the  system  of 
accumulation  was  revived ; but  the  overwhelming  influ- 
ence of  the  glorious  victories  of  our  brave  and  patri- 
otic soldiers,  and  the  destruction  of  the  rebel  armies, — 
we  wish  we  could  say,  in  truth,  the  end  of  the  Rebellion, 
— carried  the  premium  on  gold  rapidly  down  until  it 
touched,  May  11,  28-J  premium. 

In  entering  upon  the  review  of  the  administration 
of  Mr.  McCulloch,  we  should  be  false  to  our  convictions 
of  duty  if  we  hesitated  to  own,  at  the  outset,  that  we 
have  been  most  unwillingly  brought  to  the  conclusion, 
that  the  Treasury  is  now  managed  for  the  benefit  of 
private  interests,  and  not  for  the  public  weal.  Whether 
this  is  from  want  of  ability  on  the  part  of  those  having 
control  of  our  national  finances,  — and  we  are  not  for- 
getting that  Congress  has  to  take  its  full  share  of  the 
responsibility,  — or  whether  it  is  because  the  managers 
have  an  interest  in  the  profits  arising  from  the  secret 
manipulations  of  the  public  funds,  we  shall  leave  our 
readers  to  judge,  only  remarking  that  it  is  a little  sin- 


gular  that  the  public  should  so  generally  look  upon  Mr. 
McCulloch  as  belonging  to  Jay  Cooke  & Co.,  and  talk  of 
his  being  sent  by  them  to  London  as  their  agent,  when 
he  seems  to  be  of  so  much  more  service  to  them  at 
Washington  than  he  could  possibly  be  at  London. 

But  let  us  see  the  evidence  that  brings  to  such  con- 
clusions. 

Every  one  who  has  watched  the  foreign  market  has 
invariably  seen  the  value  of  our  securities  — all,  national, 
State,  and  corporate  — advancing  there  with  every  fall  in 
the  price  of  gold  here,  and  falling  with  every  advance 
in  the  same, — (to  quote  from  another  Frankfort  letter, 
“ Nos  variations  suivent  celles  de  Vor  chez  vous”  — our 
variations  (in  bonds)  follow  the  variations  of  gold  with 
you),  — keeping  all  the  while  at  about  i of  one  to  one 
per  cent  above  our  home  gold  price,  thus  making  them 
available  as  bills  of  exchange  to  an  amount  exceeding 
twenty-five  millions  a month  for  the  last  two  and  a half 
years,  drawing  them  continually  from  us,  at  the  least 
possible  advance,  at  a sacrifice  of  more  than  one-third 
of  the  value,  on  the  average  of  the  two  and  a half 
years,  and  this  to  pile  up  gold  in  the  Treasury.  For 
example,  5-20  bonds  in  London,  at  the  time  when  Mr. 
McCulloch  made  his  promise  to  resume  “Specie  pay- 
ments, July  1,  1868,  did  not  return  us  two-thirds  of  a 
dollar  in  gold  ; and  yet,  by  hoarding  gold,  he  was  making 
it  scarcer  and  dearer,  and  forcing  these  bonds  upon 
Europe  at  this  ruinous  sacrifice,  when,  if  we  resume 
specie  payment  at  the  time  promised,  we  must  pay  the 
full  value.  In  other  words,  the  Government  were  mak- 
ing a loan  for  the  people , for  say  two  and  a half  years, 
at  six  per  cent  gold  interest,  receiving  two-thirds  only 
of  the  principle,  paying  thus  exactly  twenty-two  and 


10 


one-third  per  cent  interest  in  gold  premium,  and  this 
not  to  bring  gold  into  the  country,  but  merchandise ; 
for  it  is  a fact  that  the  bankers  of  London  were  obliged, 
at  dilferent  times,  to  empty  the  bonded  warehouses  of 
London  of  staple  foreign  merchandise,  — teas,  coffee, 
sugar,  &c.,  — to  ship  to  this  country  to  settle  balances, 
as  shipping  specie  would  reduce  the  price  with  us  so 
much  as  to  destroy  the  calculated  profits. 

Furthermore,  the  general  importations  were  greatly 
increased,  to  our  loss,  by  the  abundance  of  money  pro- 
duced by  these  forced  sales  of  securities  abroad,  and  the 
inflations  of  values  continued  by  this  forced  advance  in 
the  price  of  gold,  consequent  upon  the  withdrawing  so 
large  an  amount  from  the  market,  and  placing  it  be- 
yond the  reach  of  the  business  community,  the  amount 
having  exceeded  one  hundred  millions. 

One  would  think  that  the  loss  of  five  or  six  millions 
annual  interest  would  prevent  such  an  immense  accu- 
mulation of  idle  capital ; but  when  we  consider,  further, 
that  every  dollar  of  gold  hoarded  forced  ten  thousand 
times  that  amount  of  our  public  securities  upon  a 
foreign  market  at  gold  rates, — 10,000  fori,  — at  an 
actual  loss  to  the  people,  when  settling-day  comes,  of 
more  than  one-third  value,  we  must  estimate  the  actual 
loss  to  the  country  at  some  hundreds  of  millions  of  dol- 
lars. 

Had  Mr.  McCulloch  followed  the  example  of  Secre- 
tary Fessenden,  which  had  proved  its  value  and  power 
during  a time  of  war,  the  market  would  have  been  left 
to  itself,  the  regular  movements  of  business  would  have 
brought  things  down  to  “ hard  pan,”  we  should  have 
been  able  to  resume  specie  payments  with  this  new 
year,  1868,  and  greenbacks  and  national  bank  bills 


11 


would  to-day  have  been  as  good  as  gold  or  silver  dol- 
lars. We  went  through  the  war  without  foreign  loans, 
and  we  should  have  been  wiser  and  more  independent 
if  we  had  kept  our  bonds  at  home  since  the  peace  ; for 
now  we  have  near  eight  hundred  millions  securities  on 
the  other  side  held  against  us,  putting  further  off  the 
day  of  resumption,  — for  we  must  bring  the  foreign 
market  value  to  tally  with  our  own  before  we  can 
resume  specie  payments,  — otherwise  they  will  come 
back  upon  us. 

This  was  the  point  for  a wise  and  honest  secretary 
of  the  Treasury  to  make  — a good  credit  in  foreign 
markets.  Had  the  gold  market  been  left  to  itself,  with 
no  accumulation  in  the  Treasury,  we  should  have  kept 
our  bonds  at  home  until  they  were  better  appreciated 
abroad,  and  at  least  half  the  amount  now  held  there 
would  have  been  saved  to  the  country. 

We  should  read  in  the  New- York  papers  with  sur- 
prise, did  we  not  know  that  such  articles  are  bought 
and  paid  for,  the  opinion,  that,  “ with  one  hundred  and 
fifty  millions  in  the  Treasury,  we  could  resume  specie 
payment:”  four  times  that  amount  would  not  offset  the 
influence  of  the  bonds  that  would  come  back  upon  us, 
with  the  present  difference  in  the  home  and  foreign 
values  of  our  securities. 

If  we  really  want  to  resume  specie  payments,  we 
must  bring  the  mercantile  value  of  gold  down  to  par  : 
this  we  can  do  by  making  it  plenty,  not  by  making  it 
scarce.  As  we  reduce  the  price  of  gold,  we  can  reduce 
the  amount  of  currency ; reducing  the  amount  of 
currency  will  greatly  help  the  reduction  of  the  price 
of  gold.  With  gold  at  par  to-day,  five-sevenths  of  the 
amount  of  to-day’s  circulation  would  go  as  far  as  the 


12 


whole  amount  we  now  have  with  gold  at  40  per  cent 
premium. 

Stop  the  accumulation  of  gold  in  the  Treasury  by 
giving  a daily  supply  from  it,  equal  to  the  daily  demand  • 
call  in  your  circulation  as  rapidly  as  the  price  of  gold 
is  reduced, — and  you  will  see  the  value  of  our 
securities  abroad  go  up  as  rapidly  as  the  price  of  gold 
goes  down  with  us.  But  how  can  we  call  in  our  circu- 
lation to  accomplish  this?  Nothing  more  simple.  Es- 
tablish, at  each  of  the  great  cities  of  our  country, 
points  of  redemption,  at  which  our  national  bank  bills 
shall  be  redeemed  in  greenbacks  for  the  present ; and 
you  will  send  home  the  bank  bills,  equallize  the  circu- 
lation, and  give  specie  power  to  the  greenback  for  this 
work  of  redemption,  and  rid  the  country  of  its  surplus 
circulation  if  there  is  any.  Now  we  have  a surplus  of 
circulation  in  one  place,  and  a short  supply  in  another ; 
surplus  of  small  bills  here,  scarcity  there ; and  the 
same  with  the  larger  denominations.  Redeem  bank 
bills  with  greenbacks,  and  you  will  soon  be  able  to 
redeem  greenbacks  with  gold,  and  the  motion  to  repu- 
diate 5-20s  will  be  indefinitely  postponed.  Greenbacks 
are  now,  and  always  should  be,  more  popular  with 
the  people  than  bank  bills,  and  there  is  no  reason  why 
the  public  treasury  should  not  have  the  benefit  of  all 
the  circulation  needed  for  the  business  of  the  country. 

Balances  at  the  Clearing  Houses  are  now  settled  with 
greenbacks  instead  of  specie  as  formerly,  and  they  are 
much  more  convenient  and  just  as  good  for  that  service. 

Very  little  specie  will  be  needed  for  home  use  when 
a greenback  will  give  us  its  promise  in  gold.  It  is  a 
well-settled  principle  in  economic  science,  “ that  the 
quantity  of  specie  necessary  in  any  country  depends 


13 


very  much  upon  the  method  .of  doing  business,  and  has 
no  relation  to  the  quantity  of  commodities.”  With  us, 
specie  is  not  popular  as  a currency  ; and  with  the  re- 
sumption of  specie  payments  by  the  Government,  and 
bank  bills  redeemed  in  greenbacks,  it  would  only  be 
needed,  to  any  amount,  to  settle  foreign  balances. 

Experience  having  taught  us  that  “at  all  times  and 
places  that  is  dear  which  it  is  difficult  to  come  at,”  we 
regard  the  hoarding  of  gold  to  the  enhancement  of  the 
price  thereof,  with  its  consequent  sacrifice  of  our  securi- 
ties in  foreign  markets,  as  a part  of  the  secret  system  of 
the  manipulation  of  the  business  of  the  U.  S.  Treasury 
Department  for  the  benefit  of  private  interests.  It  is 
not  for  the  interest  of  speculators  that  gold  should  be 
brought  to  par  value. 

The  position  of  Government  bankers,  under  this 
secret  system , is  of  enormous  value.  Intrusted  with 
the  secret  of  every  new  movement  in  advance  of  the 
public,  with  the  immense  amount  of  sales  on  time  daily 
made,  the  profits  of  this  advantage  can  be  reckoned  by 
millions  in  the  last  three  years.  A statement  in  a 
New-York  paper  gave  the  sales  of  Government  bonds, 
by  Jay  Cooke  & Co.,  in  their  New-York  branch  alone, 
as  rising  [six  lines  omitted , as  the  amounts  have  been 
disputed  since  publication^.  When  w~e  add  to  the  tran- 
sactions in  Government  bonds,  those  in  gold,  State 
bonds,  railroad  stocks  and  bonds,  and  other  securities, 
all  influenced  more  or  less  by  the  price  of  gold,  the 
sum  total  of  the  daily  transactions  in  New  York  alone 
is  enormous  ; and  the  speculators  and  gamblers  of  that 
city  could  afford  to  pay  to  the  powers  that  be  a million 
a month  to  continue  the  present  secret  system  of  man- 
agement of  the  U.  S.  Treasury  affairs.  With  gold  at 
par  these  serious  fluctuations  would  disappear. 


14 


With  public  notice  of  Treasury  movements,  the  whole 
public  could  bid  for  the  supply  of  Government  wants, 
as  was  the  case  during  the  administration  of  Mr.  Chase, 
and  confidence  in  the  honesty  of  the  management  would 
be  restored  at  home  and  abroad. 

Look  at  the  orders  for  conversion  of  Government 
bonds  : first  we  have  the  order  to  convert  all  7-30s  to 
5-20s;  then  stop  conversion  of  June  and  July  issue, 
and  only  convert  August  issue ; then  stop  all  conver- 
sion ; sell  5-2  Os  ; then  stop  sales,  and  convert  August 
issues  again. 

Then  the  secret  sales  at  times  of  Government  bonds, 
without  notice  to  the  public  — what  can  all  this  mean 
but  advantage  to  the  agents  who  have  notice  in  ad- 
vance of  the  public  of  these  changes,  and  can  make 
their  contracts  accordingly  ? These  things  ought  not 
so  to  be. 

We  see  members  of  Congress  and  public  servants 
growing  richer  every  day,  and  the  honest  business  men 
poorer ; the  tax-gatherers  riding  in  their  carriages,  and 
the  active  and  industrious  tax-payers  trudging  on  foot. 
How  can  this  be,  and  no  corruption  ? 

Why  this  fearful  paralysis  of  the  great  business 
activities  of  the  country,  and  this  feverish  and  frantic 
activity  of  speculation , — to  call  it  by  its  softest  term,  — 
if  there  is  no  want  of  confidence  in  the  honesty  of  the 
management  of  the  National  Treasury  ? 

There  is  an  irrepressible  conflict  between  speculation 
and  business.  When  speculators  thrive,  the  mechani- 
cal, manufacturing,  and  mercantile  interests  suffer. 
That  legislation  which  fosters  the  one  destroys  the 
other.  Amplius. 


